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Introduction
Rising income inequality is a growing concern 
for governments due to its adverse effect on 
the poverty level, income distribution, social 
and institutional stability, which in turn impede 
the economic growth and may lead to political 
instability. Taxation has long been regarded as 
the key instrument in a fi scal policy to reduce 
income inequality via the redistribution of 
tax revenues to fi nance public goods and to 
correct for market-income inequality (Atkinson, 
1991). Although prior studies have extensively 
investigated the effect of taxation on income 
inequality (Martinez-Vazquez et al., 2012), 
the fi ndings are inconclusive especially in 
developing countries (Bird & Zolt, 2014). 
The ineffective redistribution role of taxation 
in developing countries is mainly due to 
fi scal corruption and tax evasion that distort 
the distribution process (Richupan, 1984). 
Consequently, a high percentage of taxes 
remain uncollected; hence, the value added 
tax (VAT) system becomes the most popular 
tool to increase fi scal revenues in developing 
economies.
Nevertheless the use of VAT to reduce 
income inequality is debatable due to its 
regressive nature. This is because lower 
income earners pay larger percentage of their 
income on consumption of good and services 
as compared to higher income earners (Tait, 
1991). Consequently, empirical evidences 
found that VAT widens income inequality (see 
Leahy et al., 2011; Martinez-Vazquez et al., 
2012). Despite of this reason, VAT generates 
a substantial portion of tax revenue in nearly 130 
countries (Keen & Mintz, 2004) and a quarter 
of the world’s tax revenue (Bye et al., 2012). 
Besides, VAT is also found to reduce income 
inequality in developed countries (Bye et al., 
2012). This becomes an open debate on the 
implementation of VAT because distortionary 
collection of taxes affects economic growth 
adversely (Narayanan, 2014); hence, countries 
around the globe have resorted to reform their 
tax policy by implementing the VAT system. 
Therefore, this study seeks to examine the 
impact of VAT on income inequality so as 
to establish the viability of such policy in 
reducing the income inequality as claimed by 
the politicians and prior empirical studies. This 
study provides an insight to the policy makers 
on the feasibility of the VAT system to achieve 
a better income distribution than the traditional 
personal income tax and corporate tax systems.
In addition, the country governance had 
been widely documented as a key contributor to 
the successful implementation of VAT (La Porta 
et al., 1999). Economists agree that governance 
is a critical factor in explaining the performance 
variations across different countries because it 
affects resources allocation. Therefore, good 
governance contributes to a good tax system, 
which is vital for tax distribution process to 
reduce income inequality. In addition, the tax 
structure is highly responsive to a governance 
structure that enhances the collection of tax to 
be distributed to the productive sectors, as Bird 
and Zolt (2008) suggested.
We further investigate the impact of 
VAT on income inequality in developed and 
developing countries by adding the role of 
country governance in our research model. 
We split the sample into developed and 
developing countries. We argue that varying 
level of economic development contributes 
to the differential impacts of VAT on income 
inequality. To the best of our knowledge this is 
the fi rst attempt to examine the effect of country 
governance on the link between VAT and income 
inequality. Our research focuses on countries 
with VAT system to determine the governance 
factors that could improve the link between 
VAT and income inequality. In doing so, our 
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fi ndings enhance the understanding of this link 
among the policy makers and underscore the 
importance of improving the country governance 
to realize the positive effect of the VAT on 
income equality. Our fi ndings provide insights 
for better policy implementation by identifying 
a set of governance factors that contribute to 
greater effi ciency and effectiveness of VAT 
as a tool for income distribution in different 
environment setups (e.g., developed versus 
developing economies).
We seek to identify a sound institutional 
framework that can be utilized by governments 
to mitigate the detrimental effects of the VAT 
system. We believe that the quality of country 
governance affect the resource allocation 
and income distribution because it serves as 
an incentive for the regulators to implement 
policies that are benefi cial for the nation. 
We make an important contribution to policy 
implementation with regard to taxation, in 
particular, the VAT system despite its regressive 
nature and its potential harmful effect to the 
economy. Ultimately, we introduce a model 
for the effective implementation of the VAT to 
narrow income inequality.
1. Literature Review and Hypothesis 
Development
1.1 VAT and Income Inequality
VAT has been widely used since the 1960s 
in more than 160 developed and developing 
nations. The use of VAT enhances the effi ciency 
and effectiveness of the overall taxation system 
(Keen & Lockwood, 2010; Narayanan, 2014) to 
fi nance socioeconomic development, fi nance 
bigger government, and reduce trade defi cits 
(Mitchell, 2005). VAT is found to increase the total 
tax revenue in both developed and developing 
economies, for example in New Zealand VAT 
produced 18% of the total tax revenue (Hajek, 
2001) and more than 50% in Slovak Republic 
(Banociova, 2009). Nevertheless, the use of 
VAT as a tool of revenue generation is highly 
debatable on the political desk. The proponents 
of VAT claim that it is less damaging to the 
country’s economy because it is charged at 
a uniform and relatively low rate. Furthermore, 
VAT enables the government to generate more 
revenue to fi nance the country’s growth with 
greater investment in public infrastructure, 
education, welfare, healthcare, and national 
security (Mitchell, 2005), which are vital to 
reduce the inequality in the economy. Yang and 
Zhou (2011) found that undertaking tax reform 
by implementing an indirect tax such as VAT 
as the main tax system in China narrowed the 
gap between the urban and rural income. This 
is supported by Avi-Yonah (2014) on the use of 
VAT to fi nance more social programs in America 
to reduce the income inequality.
Nevertheless, the impact of VAT is debatable 
due to its regressive nature. Consequently, VAT 
negatively affects income distribution because 
the lower income households spend a higher 
percentage of their income on VAT than the 
high income households, thus widening the 
income gap. Barrett and Wall (2006) found 
support for this assertion in their study of the 
distributional impact of VAT from 2000 to 2004 
in Ireland. Leahy et al. (2011) also found that 
lower income households were greatly affected 
by the VAT. In addition, Poblete (2010) observed 
that the poverty and income distribution in 
Chile improved and income tax increased after 
a cut in the VAT rate. Similarly, Mussa (2014) 
found that expanding the zero rating coverage 
and exemption on food, health and education 
contributed to better poverty reduction and 
narrows the income inequality. This was 
possibly due to the fact that without such crucial 
exemptions the households from lower income 
group spend higher percentage of their income 
on VAT than higher income groups.
H1: Higher VAT revenue increases income 
inequality.
1.2 The Moderating Role of Country 
Governance
Country governance is an important element in 
attaining an effective and effi cient formulation 
and implementation of government policy, 
particularly in the redistribution of tax 
collections. According to Tanzi and Chu (1992), 
a country with high growth rate may fail to 
reduce income inequality due to the impairment 
of the redistributive government policy. Prior 
studies found that countries with a high level of 
corruption tend to have lower collection of tax 
revenues. A high level of corruption reduces the 
state’s ability to allocate funds generated from 
tax collection for the betterment of the society 
(Tanzi & Dvoodi, 1997) and causes signifi cant 
leakages in tax revenue (Ajaz & Ahmad, 2010). 
Studies have observed that rising corruption 
increases income inequality in Asia (Li et al., 
2000), Africa (Kwabena, 2002), Middle Eastern 
countries (Imam & Jacobs, 2007), and various 
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countries (Gupta et al., 2002). Meanwhile, 
Adams and Klobodu (2016) found that control 
for corruption and higher transparency lowered 
income inequality in the Sub-Saharan African 
countries.
Instead of focusing on corruption, we include 
various measures of country governance. Even 
though country governance is widely recognized 
as a tool for more effi cient and effective tax 
distribution to reduce income inequality, the 
empirical evidence is scant (Everest-Phillips 
& Sandall, 2009). As La Porta et al. (1999) 
suggested that the quality of governance is 
vital in determining the success of government 
performance. Better governance contributes 
to economic stability and leads to higher 
fi nancial development, which in turn increases 
tax resources (Ajaz & Ahmad, 2010). Besides, 
Sumarto et al. (2003) found that poor governance 
adversely affected the poverty reduction efforts 
of the Indonesian government. Muinelo-Gallo 
and Miranda (2014) and Kyriacou et al. (2017) 
found that country governance is necessary to 
reduce the income inequality given the fi scal 
decentralization. Similarly, Chen and Kinkyo 
(2016) also found that good governance is 
a critical factor to reduce income inequality. On 
the other hand, Akram et al. (2011) observed 
that country governance was positively related to 
poverty in the long run but not in the short run. 
Thus, we offer our second hypothesis, as follows: 
H2: Higher VAT revenue reduces income 
inequality in countries with higher quality 
governance.
2. Methodology
2.1 Empirical Model
We fi rst study the impact of value-added tax on 
income inequality using the system Generalized 
Method of Moments (GMM) as shown in 
Equation (1), which is the base equation in our 
study. We derived the equation based on the 
growth model.
itVATitInequalityitInequality  2110 
itInvestmentitInflationitCapGDP  54/3    
itLiteracyitFinDevitTrade  876 
itetyeartCrisisDitGovExp  )( 19   
(1)
Where ith refers to the individual country and 
t is the time period involved. Our dependent 
variable is income inequality (Inequality), 
measured by the Gini coeffi cient. Income 
inequality refers to distribution of money 
income, which has implications for a nation’s 
economic health and policy. The Gini coeffi cient 
measures the dispersion of the income on 
a scale between 0 and 1 where the coeffi cient 
of 1 indicates a perfect income inequality, 
whereas a lower coeffi cient indicates greater 
income equality.
The variable of interest in this study is 
VAT, which is the ratio of VAT collection to 
government revenue. This ratio is a substitute 
for the VAT rate due to unavailability of the rate 
in a time-series manner. In addition, using the 
ratio of VAT collection to government revenue 
enables us to assess the commitment of the 
government towards the implementation of 
VAT as a tool to generate revenue for funding 
the country economic development. We 
predict that VAT is positively related to income 
inequality due to its regressive nature. Putting 
it differently, we hypothesize that higher VAT 
revenue widens income inequality.
We control for GDP per capita (GDP/Cap), 
infl ation (Infl ation), investment (Investment), 
trade openness (Trade), fi nancial development 
(FinDev), literacy rate (Literacy), and 
government spending (GovExp) which infl uence 
income inequality based on the endogenous 
growth model. The real GDP per capita with 
the base year of 2010 is the control variable for 
economic development. This is important for 
cross-country analysis as the different countries 
are characterized by different economic 
development. Higher real GDP per capita 
refl ects higher average disposable income per 
individual household, which lowers the income 
inequality. Infl ation is a control variable that 
captures the effect of the macroeconomic policy 
environment. An effective macroeconomic 
policy makes an infl ationary episode in the 
country more stable and hence reduces the 
income inequality. This is because infl ation 
leads to increases in prices that result in 
declines in real income (Tanzi, 1977).
We also control for the effect of investment, 
which is measured by the ratio of gross capital 
formation to GDP. A higher ratio reduces income 
inequality due to higher average productivity 
among individuals. We also used trade 
openness to refl ect the degree of exposure 
of an economy to external economic shocks. 
Higher trade openness may increase or reduce 
income inequality; it may also increase trade 
t t
tt
t
t t
t t
t
t
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integration of the country, which would increase 
income inequality (Milanovic & Squire, 2007). 
In addition, we employ fi nancial development to 
refl ect the degree of market integration due to 
dynamic globalization and liberalization.
The literacy rate measures the education 
level of the individuals as well as human 
capital development of a country. Higher 
education level reduces income inequality due 
to the “compression” effect (Knight & Sabot, 
1983). According to Zhang (1996), a higher 
education level enhances labor skills that will 
lead to an increase in average income and 
therefore narrows income inequality. The ratio 
of government spending to GDP constitutes 
a major source of income distribution towards 
the economic development and social welfare. 
Effective and effi cient government spending 
on welfare (education and health) contributes 
to higher human capital development, which 
increases the employment opportunities in the 
economy (Shafi que & Haq, 2006) and, eventually, 
narrowing income inequality gap. Finally, it is 
important to control for economic crises (Crisis) 
because they lead to external shocks that hinder 
economic development and distort economic 
policy implementation. Also, economic crises 
increase the unemployment rate due to the 
slowdown in the demand for goods and services 
and, thus, ultimately widen income inequality.
Following In’airat (2014) we use initial GDP 
as the instrumental variable in our estimation 
to correct for the endogeneity issues pertaining 
to the GDP per capita, infl ation, investment and 
trade. The economic condition and investment 
largely depends on the country’s performance.
Next, we add the interaction terms between 
country governance variables and VAT, as 
shown in Equation (2) to study the effect of the 
quality of a country’s governance in improving 
tax collection effi ciency and reducing income 
inequality in which Govit is the different types of 
country governance that we obtained from the 
International Country Risk Group (ICRG).
 
(2)
According to Akram et al. (2011), good 
governance is benefi cial for reducing poverty 
and income inequality because it minimizes 
abuses of power by the authorities. This is 
especially true in developing countries where 
institutional problems are the major obstacles 
in tax collection that hinder the country’s 
development (Ajaz & Ahmad, 2010). Bird and 
Zolt (2008) offered support for this assertion 
when they reported that the tax structure 
and effi ciency are highly responsive to the 
country’s governance, which affects the ability 
of the economy to fulfi ll social obligations. 
Furthermore, good country governance is 
effi cient in protecting private property, able to 
boost economic activities and macroeconomic 
stability and effective in managing social 
confl icts to achieve sustainable economic 
growth. In this case, we expect α10 to reduce 
income inequality and α11 is the parameters to 
be estimate for the interaction terms of country 
governance with VAT collection where we 
expect to be positive if the country governance 
helps to mitigate the regressive impact of VAT 
and enhance income distribution.
We employ two-step system GMM to 
estimate Equations (1) and (2) because 
income inequality is not a random walk where 
the performance of the country depends on it 
past performance. Therefore, system GMM 
helps to correct for the autocorrelation in 
income inequality. The GMM technique is 
superior in addressing potential endogeneity, 
heteroskedasticity, and autocorrelation 
problems (Doytch & Uctum, 2011). Furthermore, 
system GMM provides more effi cient estimates 
when the instruments used are weak (Blundell 
& Bond, 1998).
The sample of this study consists of 105 
countries from 1984 to 2014. The macroeconomic 
data are obtained from Thomson Datastream 
whereas the data for country governance are 
from the ICRG database. We further split the 
sample into developed and developing countries 
to study the differential impact of VAT on income 
inequality in such countries due to the differences 
in the objective of VAT and government policies. 
The list of developed and developing countries 
is from from the United Nations Economic and 
Social Council of the General Assembly.
3. Results and Discussions
We use two-step system GMM estimation 
to obtain the standard robust estimation in 
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determining the impact of VAT on income 
inequality and the moderating role of the 
country’s governance in the link between VAT 
and income inequality for the full sample, 
developed countries, and developing countries. 
Tab. 2 shows the estimated results for the full 
sample. Tabs. 3 and 4 present the estimated 
results for developed and developing countries, 
respectively. Our base model is Model 1, in 
which we examine the main effect of VAT 
on income inequality. Models 2 through 8 
present the moderating effect of the country 
governance.
Results from Model 1 in Tab. 2 indicate 
that VAT increases income inequality at a 5% 
signifi cance level, which supports the argument 
that VAT is regressive in nature. This result is 
in line with the studies of Leahy et al. (2011) 
and Martinez-Vazquez et al. (2012). In terms 
of economic signifi cance, an increase in VAT 
revenue as measured by the ratio of VAT 
collection to government revenue by one 
(sample) standard deviation increases income 
inequality by 0.29 percentage points, which 
is a relatively small effect. Nevertheless, the 
signifi cant impact of VAT on income inequality 
in developed countries is benign (Tab. 3) and 
VAT reduces income inequality in developing 
countries a 1% signifi cance level (Tab. 4). This 
fi nding supports our fi rst hypothesis that higher 
VAT revenue increases income inequality 
but not in developing economies. VAT may 
increase revenue collection in developing 
countries in fi nancing transfers and provision 
of public goods, which results in reductions in 
income inequality in the developing countries 
as compared to developed countries which 
already have a well-established and effi cient 
tax collection process. This fi nding corroborates 
the result of Avi-Yonah (2014), which found that 
VAT to fi nance social programs reduced income 
inequality and led to higher economic growth 
(Magu, 2013).
Next, we fi nd that higher quality bureaucracy 
reduces income inequality at a 5% signifi cance 
level, thus, supporting our assertion that higher 
quality bureaucracy mitigates the regressive 
effect of VAT. The results are consistent for the 
full sample, developed countries and developing 
countries. Hence, this fi nding suggests that 
improving the quality of bureaucracy is critical 
to spur the development process by minimizing 
incidents of abuse of power by government 
offi cials and the negative infl uence of political 
masters in the government machineries, 
particularly in tax revenue allocation, thus 
reducing income inequality.
We also fi nd that high level of corruption 
control reduces income inequality at a 1% 
signifi cance level (Model 3), which is in line 
with the common expectation that an effective 
corruption control enhances the government 
effi ciency (Mauro, 1997). Conversely, poor 
corruption control distorts the allocation of 
government fi nancial resources, ultimately 
adversely affecting the distribution of income 
(see Gupta et al., 2002). The results are 
consistent across the three samples as shown 
in Tab. 2. Our results also suggest that higher 
VAT revenue and a higher level of corruption 
control reduce income inequality in both 
developed and developing countries. This is 
consistent with the fi ndings of Li et al. (2000) 
in Asia, Kwabena (2002) in Africa, Imam and 
Jacobs (2007) in Middle Eastern countries, and 
a cross-country analysis by Gupta et al. (2002). 
As highlighted by Tanzi and Dvoodi (1997), 
a lower level of corruption due to an effective 
corruption control enhances the allocation 
of funds generated by tax collection for the 
society’s well-being and reduces the leakages 
in tax revenue (Ajaz & Ahmad, 2010).
Third, in terms of democratic accountability 
the result of Model 4 from Tab. 2 shows that the 
interaction between democratic accountability 
and VAT revenues reduces income inequality. 
This fi nding indicates that ensuring free and 
fair elections and responding to the needs 
of the people are not suffi cient to narrow 
the income gap between the poor and the 
rich in developing countries. This is easy to 
understand because governments must have 
adequate fi nancial resources and be highly 
responsive to the needs of the people to 
ensure that the people have access to a good 
education, public amenities, quality healthcare, 
and growing economic activities and, thus, 
enjoy greater access to the wealth of the 
nation which seems to be weak in developing 
countries. Nevertheless, we observe that the 
interaction term of VAT revenue and democratic 
accountability reduce income inequality in both 
developed and developing countries. This 
fi nding suggests that democratization improves 
income distribution as educated individuals 
have more voice in public decisions and, hence, 
are able to redistribute resources to the poor 
more effi ciently (Chong & Calderón, 2000). 
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The voice of educated individuals is even more 
crucial in implementing the VAT because it is 
viewed as a highly regressive tax accompanied 
by the government’s promise to improve the 
society’s economic well-being with better tax 
collection.
Fourth, Model 5 of Tab. 1 shows the 
interaction term of the VAT revenue and the 
government stability reduces income inequality 
in both developed (1% signifi cance level) and 
developing countries (5% signifi cance level). 
These results indicate that governments 
in developed economies are better able to 
implement policies and programs as declared 
than developing economies, which are often 
characterized by ineffi ciency in the allocation 
of resources due to market asymmetry. Similar 
to our results on democratic accountability 
(in terms of the main effect and economic 
signifi cance), the result on government stability 
shows that high stability in the government of 
the day is not an important factor in narrowing 
the income gap, but its combination with higher 
government fi nancial resources in terms of 
higher collection of the VAT revenue creates 
the desired effect.
Fifth, the result of Model 6 in Tab. 1 
suggests that the combination of higher VAT 
revenue and high-quality law and order narrows 
the income gap in our sample countries at 
a 1% signifi cance level. Our result implies 
that an effective and impartial legal system 
enhances the distribution of government 
fi nancial resources by ensuring that abuse 
of power incidents are dealt with seriously, 
thus minimizing leakage in the government 
development expenditure due to unscrupulous 
behavior. In contrast, law and order does not 
signifi cantly moderate the effect of VAT revenue 
on income inequality in developing countries. 
We reckon that this contrasting result may be 
due to the well-established, stronger, and more 
impartial legal system in developed countries 
to minimize misallocation of VAT revenue and 
ensure its utilization for economic activities to 
promote more equitable distribution of income 
for fear of legal reprisal. The weak effect in 
developing countries may due to weaker legal 
system that opens up opportunity for abuse 
of power and failure to implement benefi cial 
policies for the people.
Sixth, we found that the interaction term 
between political risk and VAT revenue reduces 
the income inequality by 7.90% (Model 7) 
and it is statistically signifi cant at a 1% level 
for both developed and developing countries. 
This fi nding implies that high political stability 
enables the government to focus on devising 
and implementing development and economic 
programs to narrow income inequality. We fi nd 
that the interaction term of VAT revenue and the 
political risk rating reduces income inequality at 
10% signifi cance level. This result suggests 
that higher VAT revenue weakens the positive 
effect of low political risk on income inequality 
in all our samples. This may due stable political 
environment enables the government to operate 
with greater latitude to implement economic 
and development programs with certainty, 
the impact is minimal if the government has 
strong political power and stability to focus on 
charting and steering the nations’ economic 
and development strategies uninterrupted by 
political and social noise. Political and social 
tensions can derail a government’s ability to 
perform its duty to the people even when the 
fi scal position is strong. This is supported by 
Aizenman and Jinjarak (2008), who highlighted 
that greater political stability increases the 
effi ciency of tax collection and, hence, increases 
the resources devoted to tax enforcement for 
the benefi t of social well-being.
Finally, in Model 8 of Tab. 2, we fi nd that 
the interaction term between socioeconomic 
conditions and VAT revenues reduces 
income inequality at a 1% signifi cance 
level in developed economies. Favorable 
socioeconomic conditions such as low 
unemployment, robust consumer confi dence, 
and low poverty reduce income inequality by 
1.32%. This result is not surprising because 
socioeconomic conditions are directly related 
to the individual and household level of income 
and distribution of wealth (OECD, 2012). 
Furthermore, we observe that the interaction 
term of VAT revenue and socioeconomic 
conditions has a marginally signifi cant negative 
relationship with income inequality at a 10% 
level. Our fi nding suggests that improving 
socioeconomic conditions alone has a stronger 
impact in reducing the income gap. However, 
implementation of the VAT system that adds 
to the government tax revenue appears to 
weaken this impact from the statistical point 
of view. This fi nding implies that government 
should focus on implementing policies that can 
boost employment opportunities to improve 
the socioeconomic condition particularly in 
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lower income group to benefi ts from the VAT 
implementation (OECD, 2012).
However, we observe a contrasting result 
for the developing countries in which the 
socioeconomic conditions positively moderate 
the effect of VAT revenue and income inequality 
at a 1% level, which we note seems to drive 
the result of the full sample (i.e., marginal 
moderating effect only). The state of the 
socioeconomic conditions in developing 
countries further exacerbates the negative 
effect of the VAT revenue on income inequality 
that we observe in the full sample as well as 
in both the developed and developing countries 
samples. Putting it differently, the socioeconomic 
conditions moderate the effect of VAT revenue 
on income inequality in developing countries 
but in a negative way. In contrast, the state 
of socioeconomic conditions in the developed 
countries reverses the negative effect of 
VAT revenue on income inequality, which is 
a desirable outcome. This fi nding suggests that 
stable socioeconomic conditions indicate a low 
degree of socioeconomic pressure and social 
dissatisfaction that enable the government to 
focus on implementing VAT revenue allocation 
policies in a way that reduces the income 
gap between the poor and the rich without 
distraction, thereby realizing the redistributive 
effect of the VAT system.
Variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8
Inequality (-1) 1.033***(0.012)
0.326***
(0.013)
0.399***
(0.022)
0.381***
(0.015)
0.987***
(0.015)
0.984***
(0.022)
0.753***
(0.024)
0.889***
(0.005)
VAT 0.004**(0.002)
2.220**
(1.059)
0.388
(0.345)
67.074***
(17.33)
0.088**
(0.036)
1.035***
(0.259)
1.570*
(0.917)
0.586
(0.357)
GDP/Cap 0.238***(0.038)
0.351***
(0.113)
0.633***
(0.242)
0.511**
(0.228)
0.231
(0.143)
0.124
(0.153)
0.126
(0.177)
0.032***
(0.010)
Infl ation -0.103***(0.014)
0.044
(0.045)
-0.086
(0.103)
-0.023
(0.084)
0.017
(0.063)
0.003
(0.057)
0.093
(0.088)
-0.030***
(0.003)
Investment 1.313(0.906)
16.676***
(2.487)
17.339***
(3.195)
16.162***
(3.179)
5.384**
(2.679)
4.085
(2.512)
0.764
(3.125)
2.573***
(0.645)
Trade -0.793**(0.346)
-1.808*
(1.015)
-0.972
(0.953)
-0.446
(1.050)
-0.587
(0.571)
-0.206
(0.512)
-4.146***
(0.752)
-0.639***
(0.136)
FinDev 1.189***(0.195)
6.187***
(0.858)
4.458***
(0.925)
4.335***
(0.904)
0.894*
(0.496)
1.437**
(0.606)
2.136**
(0.846)
2.921***
(0.113)
Literacy -1.839***(0.517)
-3.147***
(0.997)
-4.515**
(1.775)
-6.742***
(1.445)
-3.610**
(1.540)
-3.032*
(1.546)
-3.062**
(1.205)
-1.314***
(0.259)
GovExp -0.229(1.561)
-84.785***
(6.894)
-75.877***
(9.599)
-82.290***
(9.225)
-6.332**
(2.807)
-5.981**
(2.802)
-5.921
(5.252)
-9.807***
(0.365)
Crisis 0.994***(0.195)
2.200***
(0.522)
0.578
(0.911)
1.159
(0.810)
0.297
(0.370)
0.552
(0.365)
3.412***
(0.855)
0.901***
(0.059)
Bureaucracy - -2.070***(0.254) - - - - - -
VAT* 
Bureaucracy -
-0.905**
(0.424) - - - - - -
Corruption - - -1.165***(0.286) - - - - -
VAT* 
Corruption - -
-0.174
(0.170) - - - - -
Democratic - - - 0.653**(0.326) - - - -
VAT* 
Democratic - - -
-13.405***
(3.458) - - - -
Tab. 1: Full sample (Part 1)
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Variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8
Gstability - - - - 0.018(0.023) - - -
VAT* Gstability - - - - -0.008**(0.004) - - -
Law - - - - - 0.333(0.224) - -
VAT* Law - - - - - -0.200***(0.050) - -
Political Risk - - - - - - -0.057***(0.020) -
VAT* Political 
Risk - - - - - -
-0.022*
(0.013) -
Socioeconomic - - - - - - - -0.536***(0.026)
VAT* 
Socioeconomic - - - - - - -
-0.086*
(0.052)
Constant 3.894***(0.835)
45.828***
(2.123)
40.045***
(2.793)
36.089***
(2.414)
-1.174
(1.769)
0.294
(2.385)
19.185***
(2.782)
8.561***
(0.453)
Year dummy Included Included Included Included Included Included Included Included
Model fi ts
Wald chi2 425.00*** 137.18*** 217.17*** 187.223** 297.59*** 456.28*** 573.02*** 240.00***
AR1 -3.16*** -2.06** -2.46** -2.46** -2.95*** -2.92*** -3.38*** -3.14***
AR2 -0.97 -1.34 -1.30 -1.64 -1.06 -1.07 -1.07 -1.17
Sargan test 
(p-value)
52.91
(0.195)
50.21
(0.386)
57.09
(0.948)
55.21
(0.965)
52.50
(0.966)
48.96
(0.986)
43.10
(0.594)
59.55
(0.122)
No. of 
Instruments 85 90 118 118 115 115 88 90
No. of 
Observations 2,129 2,129 2,129 2,129 2,129 2,129 2,129 2,129
Source: own
Note: This table gives the regression estimation results based on two-stage GMM. Inequality refers to the Gini coeffi cient 
in percentage; VAT is the percentage of valued-added tax to GDP; GDP/Cap is the natural logarithm of real GDP per 
capita; Infl ation is the percentage of infl ation rate; Investment is the percentage of real gross capital formation to GDP 
ratio base year of 2010; Trade is the ratio of trade openness; FinDev is the ratio of private credit to GDP; Literacy is the 
literacy rate measured in percentage; GovExp is the percentage of government expenditure to GDP; Crisis if the dummy 
variable assigned for economic crisis (1 = crisis year; otherwise, 0); Bureaucracy refers to bureaucracy quality; Corrupti-
on refers to the corruption index; Democratic refers to democratic accountability; Gstability refers to government stability; 
Law refers to law and order; Political risk refers to political risk rating; Socioeconomic refers to socioeconomic conditions.
* represents signifi cance at 10%, ** represent signifi cance at 5%, *** represent signifi cance at 1%.
Tab. 1: Full sample (Part 2)
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Variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8
Inequality (-1) 1.025***(0.015)
1.026***
(0.038)
0.954***
(0.028)
0.984***
(0.029)
0.985***
(0.022)
0.946***
(0.031)
0.977***
(0.030)
0.938***
(0.036)
VAT 3.478(3.184)
11.468**
(5.565)
10.100
(9.174)
27.775**
(13.025)
11.475
(7.378)
25.591**
(9.869)
20.594**
(8.974)
16.669***
(6.364)
GDP/Cap 0.425***(0.047)
0.896***
(0.192)
0.474**
(0.225)
1.271***
(0.213)
1.074***
(0.194)
1.268***
(0.162)
1.196***
(0.179)
0.914***
(0.330)
Infl ation -0.325***(0.018)
-1.902**
(0.767)
0.215
(0.138)
0.052
(0.112)
-0.025
(0.080)
0.135
(0.099)
0.111
(0.089)
-0.206
(0.684)
Investment 5.129***(0.950)
3.528
(3.096)
6.913***
(2.618)
13.483***
(3.216)
8.814***
(2.665)
10.080***
(2.459)
12.651***
(3.579)
6.741***
(2.588)
Trade -3.686***(0.575)
-0.455
(0.315)
-0.132
(0.352)
-0.307
(0.269)
-0.154
(0.186)
-0.571**
(0.250)
-0.280
(0.240)
-0.445
(0.295)
FinDev -0.289(0.228)
-1.475***
(0.446)
-0.933**
(0.433)
-0.449
(0.551)
-0.618*
(0.368)
-0.241
(0.435)
-0.344
(0.484)
-0.060
(0.631)
Literacy 20.435***(6.934)
1.205
(1.828)
5.722**
(2.511)
1.868
(2.820)
3.117
(1.911)
2.248
(2.656)
2.980
(2.558)
5.971**
(2.635)
GovExp -21.266***(2.375)
-18.871***
(5.706)
-17.056***
(3.471)
-21.226***
(5.098)
-8.889***
(2.728)
-19.242***
(3.455)
-18.879***
(3.514)
-24.304***
(6.760)
Crisis 0.368***(0.121)
1.590***
(0.488)
0.073
(0.525)
0.415
(0.527)
0.613
(0.520)
0.273
(0.492)
0.404
(0.444)
1.533***
(0.472)
Bureaucracy - 0.494*(0.292) - - - - - -
VAT* 
Bureaucracy -
-0.017***
(0.004) - - - - - -
Corruption - - -0.045(0.167) - - - - -
VAT* Corruption - - -0.013***(0.003) - - - - -
Democratic - - - -0.216(0.136) - - - -
VAT* Democratic - - - -0.009***(0.002) - - - -
Gstability - - - - -0.203***(0.058) - - -
VAT* Gstability - - - - -0.006***(0.001) - - -
Law - - - - - -0.275(0.185) - -
VAT* Law - - - - - -0.007***(0.001) - -
Political Risk - - - - - - -0.016(0.014) -
VAT* Political 
Risk - - - - - -
-0.001***
(0.000) -
Socioeconomic - - - - - - - -0.009(0.063)
VAT* 
Socioeconomic - - - - - - -
-0.005***
(0.002)
Tab. 2: Developed countries (Part 1)
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Variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8
Constant 13.137**(6.800)
-9.820***
(3.536)
-6.574*
(3.498)
-12.982***
(3.057)
-12.093***
(2.336)
-11.232***
(2.855)
-12.880***
(2.771) -11.415***
Year dummy Included Included Included Included Included Included Included Included
Model fi ts
Wald chi2 482.92*** 115.70 622.00*** 120.72*** 141.75*** 130.01*** 171.87*** 292.71***
AR1 -3.67*** -1.68* -3.40*** -3.46*** -3.56*** -3.45*** -3.51*** -2.86***
AR2 0.49 0.59 -0.02 -0.30 -0.21 -0.15 -0.24 -0.17
Sargan test 
(p-value)
22.98
(0.290)
13.50
(0.636)
18.65
(0.413)
10.16
(0.927)
13.59
(0.755)
16.45
(0.561)
12.98
(0.793)
14.62
(0.552)
No. of 
Instruments 31 29 31 31 31 31 31 29
No. of 
Observations 897 897 897 897 897 897 897 897
Source: own
Note: This table gives the regression estimation results based on two-stage GMM. Inequality refers to the Gini coeffi cient 
in percentage; VAT is the percentage of valued-added tax to GDP; GDP/Cap is the natural logarithm of real GDP per 
capita; Infl ation is the percentage of infl ation rate; Investment is the percentage of real gross capital formation to GDP 
ratio base year of 2010; Trade is the ratio of trade openness; FinDev is the ratio of private credit to GDP; Literacy is the 
literacy rate measured in percentage; GovExp is the percentage of government expenditure to GDP; Crisis if the dummy 
variable assigned for economic crisis (1 = crisis year; otherwise, 0); Bureaucracy refers to bureaucracy quality; Corrupti-
on refers to the corruption index; Democratic refers to democratic accountability; Gstability refers to government stability; 
Law refers to law and order; Political risk refers to political risk rating; Socioeconomic refers to socioeconomic conditions.
* represents signifi cance at 10%, ** represent signifi cance at 5%, *** represent signifi cance at 1%.
Tab. 2: Developed countries (Part 2)
Conclusion
This study examines the effect of VAT revenue 
on income inequality and the role of country 
governance to mitigate the negative impact of 
VAT. We also examine the potential differential 
effect of the country’s governance on the 
relationship between VAT revenue and income 
inequality by splitting our sample into developed 
and developing countries. The results suggest 
that VAT increases income inequality, which 
further reinforces its regressive nature. 
However, we argue that the link between 
a tax system and income inequality is not 
straightforward due to the effect of country 
governance. Our results suggest that quality 
of bureaucracy, democratic accountability, 
government stability and law and order strongly 
moderate the link between VAT and income 
inequality. In particular, the interaction terms 
of each governance element and VAT narrow 
the income inequality, suggesting that they play 
a positive role in the allocation of VAT revenue.
On the other hand, political risk rating and 
socioeconomic conditions play a marginal 
moderating role in the same relationship. We 
conclude that higher quality governance helps 
to narrow the income inequality in countries 
with higher VAT collection in both developed 
and developing countries. Therefore, our 
fi ndings highlight that the redistributive effect of 
VAT is contingent on the quality of a country’s 
governance structure; otherwise, VAT is 
regressive and widens income inequality. Our 
fi ndings reinforce the assertion of Bird and Zolt 
(2008) that the tax structure is highly responsive 
to the governance structure that ensures the 
tax collected is distributed to productive sectors 
to support development processes, and are 
consistent with the fi nding of Ajaz and Ahmad 
(2010) and Akram et al. (2011).
The fi ndings of our study have several 
policy implications. First, the government needs 
to put in place quality governance measures to 
ensure effective distribution of VAT revenue for 
social welfare programs and economic activities 
in reducing the negative effect of the VAT on 
income inequality. Second, as the quality 
of country governance affects the resource 
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Variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8
Inequality (-1) 0.598***(0.007)
0.596***
(0.007)
0.905***
(0.003)
0.085**
(0.035)
0.740***
(0.017)
0.617***
(0.003)
0.767***
(0.017)
0.883***
(0.014)
VAT -20.346***(0.277)
-9.413***
(2.920)
-2.025***
(0.517)
-46.302***
(6.905)
-12.233**
(5.335)
-6.465
(4.012)
55.129***
(16.693)
-35.247***
(8.037)
GDP/Cap -0.026**(0.013)
-0.025**
(0.010)
-0.157***
(0.002)
-0.565***
(0.170)
-0.361***
(0.086)
-0.111***
(0.029)
-0.087
(0.088)
-0.089
(0.144)
Infl ation 0.045***(0.002)
0.031***
(0.001)
0.060***
(0.001)
0.300***
(0.085)
0.278***
(0.022)
0.050
(0.043)
0.176***
(0.049)
0.449***
(0.110)
Investment -15.740***(0.599)
-13.162***
(0.583)
-3.024***
(0.257)
-9.283**
(4.455)
-11.877***
(1.247)
-17.847***
(0.840)
-6.942***
(1.733)
-3.138*
(1.618)
Trade 3.498***(0.110)
2.809***
(0.153)
0.335***
(0.100)
2.184
(1.449)
0.779***
(0.273)
2.956***
(0.225)
0.217
(0.561)
1.005***
(0.367)
FinDev -0.422***(0.044)
-0.632***
(0.077)
-0.075***
(0.011)
-4.860***
(0.987)
-3.799***
(0.331)
5.533***
(0.304)
3.301***
(0.459)
0.309
(0.369)
Literacy -4.027**(1.729)
-4.493***
(1.225)
-1.504***
(0.111)
-15.354***
(5.132)
-3.460***
(0.431)
-3.735***
(0.233)
-1.015
(0.819)
-5.233***
(0.934)
GovExp -12.696***(0.830)
-2.541***
(0.872)
-3.509***
(0.199)
-12.436***
(4.855)
-55.176***
(3.494)
-31.899***
(2.701)
-40.288***
(3.993)
-23.786***
(2.936)
Crisis 0.093***(0.036)
0.106***
(0.036)
1.102***
(0.046)
0.438*
(0.257)
0.708***
(0.215)
0.309*
(0.174)
1.277***
(0.292)
1.482***
(0.375)
Bureaucracy - 2.002***(0.122) - - - - - -
VAT* 
Bureaucracy -
-3.440***
(1.003) - - - - - -
Corruption - - 0.155***(0.015) - - - - -
VAT* Corruption - - -3.709***(0.106) - - - - -
Democratic - - - 1.172***(0.252) - - - -
VAT* Democratic - - - -3.284***(0.848) - - - -
Gstability - - - - 0.272***(0.062) - - -
VAT* Gstability - - - - -1.328**(0.596) - - -
Law - - - - - -0.873***(0.127) - -
VAT* Law - - - - - -1.367(1.338) - -
Political Risk - - - - - - -0.013(0.020) -
VAT* Political 
Risk - - - - - -
-0.870***
(0.259) -
Socioeconomic - - - - - - - -0.707***(0.090)
VAT* 
Socioeconomic - - - - - - -
6.288***
(1.291)
Tab. 3: Developing countries (Part 1)
EM_4_2018.indd   89 28.11.2018   13:12:56
90 2018, XXI, 4
Ekonomie
allocation and income distribution it provides 
an incentive for the regulators to implement 
taxation policies and at simultaneously improve 
the country’s institutional quality to achieve the 
desired effect of reducing income inequality 
through fi scal policy. Third, the governments 
of developing countries need to effectively 
manage the degree of socioeconomic 
conditions that could distract them from 
focusing on implementing VAT to eradicate 
poverty and raise the income level of the poor 
segment of society. Finally, the developing 
economies should strive to avoid political 
instability that could distract them from devising 
and implementing development and economic 
programs to narrow income inequality.
This work was supported by the 
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from the Ministry of Education Malaysia.
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Abstract
THE ROLE OF COUNTRY GOVERNANCE ON VALUE-ADDED TAX 
AND INEQUALITY
Sok-Gee Chan, Zulkufl y Ramly
Income inequality is a growing concern for regulators because it brings adverse consequences 
towards social stability, institutional stability and economic performance. One of the popular ways to 
reduce income inequality is through the implementation of Value Added Tax (VAT) despite of many 
criticisms on its regressive nature. Hence, using a wide data range from 1984 to 2014, we study 
the impact of VAT on income inequality in both developed and developing countries. Besides, this 
is the fi rst study that seeks to focus on the moderating role of country governance in enhancing 
the effect of VAT on income inequality. We use the Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) to 
overcome the endogeneity, autocorrelation and heteroscedasticity issues. The results suggest that 
the VAT reduces income inequality but the positive effect is contingent upon the existence of a set 
of good country governance. Countries that have higher quality of bureaucracy, greater democratic 
accountability, high government stability, effective law and order, low political risk and favourable 
socioeconomic conditions stand to benefi t more from the VAT system in terms of narrowing the 
income inequality. Therefore, we conclude that better institutions improve the tax collection and 
public service delivery, which is a crucial element in achieving the economic objective of narrowing 
the income gap between the wealthy and the poor. This is particularly true in developing countries. 
Further, the governments in developing countries need to effectively manage the degree of 
socioeconomic pressure that could distract them from implementing social and economic policies 
to eradicate poverty and raise the income level of the poor segment of society.
Key Words: Income inequality, value added tax, tax distribution, country governance, 
Generalized Method of Moments (GMM).
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